A SUCCESSFUL (YET SOMEWHAT UNTESTED) CASE OF DISASTER FINANCING: TERRORISM INSURANCE UNDER TRIA, 2002–2020

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ABSTRACT

The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) established a public–private partnership between the U.S. federal government, private insurers, and all commercial enterprises operating on U.S. soil. Renewed and modified in January 2015 until December 2020, the TRIA program requires insurers to offer terrorism insurance to their commercial policyholders while providing insurers with free up-front financial protection up to $100 billion against terrorist attacks in the United States. With the federal government providing a financial safety net, the private insurance sector can offer coverage against an uncertain risk that would otherwise be largely considered uninsurable, thus making terrorism insurance widely available and affordable. TRIA is a successful case of public–private disaster risk financing that has received bipartisan political support. Yet it remains untested for large losses and it is unclear how the market and policymakers will react should another large-scale insured loss occur. TRIA also raises concerns about the indemnification of individual victims of a terrorist attack (in addition to workers’ compensation).
Genesis of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act Program

Terrorism has been a persistent threat in many parts of the world for decades; the first major terrorist attack in the United States occurred in February 1993. The terrorist organization Al Qaeda detonated a large truck bomb in the garage of the North Tower of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City, closing Tower 1 for 6 weeks and Tower 2 for 4 weeks. Although the building did not collapse (as the terrorists had planned), the attack killed six people and caused over $750 million in insured losses (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2004).

In April 1995, Timothy McVeigh detonated a bomb outside the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City, killing 168 people and injuring another 700. This attack damaged 324 buildings within a 16-block radius and resulted in about $650 million in damage. The federal government owned the main building and self-insured against potential losses so there were no claims filed with private insurers. The Oklahoma City bombing demonstrated that the terrorism threat could emanate from domestic sources and that a successful attack could inflict massive losses with readily available materials and not a great level of sophistication.

Then came the devastating coordinated attacks by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001. The attacks killed over 3,000 people and injured another 2,250 and resulted in record insured losses of nearly $45 billion, now second only to Hurricane Katrina as the most costly insured disaster in the world (in 2016 prices) (Wilkinson and Hartwig, 2010). Due to the international nature of insurance and reinsurance markets, nearly 120 insurers and reinsurers, many of them headquartered outside of the United States, paid these losses.

There have been a number of recent publications on terrorism risk insurance (Hartwig and Wilkinson, 2013; Dworsky and Dixon, 2014; LaTourrette and Clancy, 2014; Willis and Al-Shahery, 2014; Michel-Kerjan et al., 2015); insurance industry reports on the take-up rates and terrorism pricing (AON Benfield, 2013; Marsh, 2013) and other topics by the U.S. government and international organizations (President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, 2010, 2014; Congressional Research Service, 2013, 2014; Government Accountability Office, 2014; OECD, 2005, 2010). What is absent in this literature is a rigorous scientific approach for determining the economic losses associated with different credible modes of attacks against specific locations in the United States that quantifies how those losses would be shared among different stakeholders, namely, American taxpayers (the federal government), insurers, and commercial firms whether they are insured against terrorism or not. This will be a focus of this article.

We first discuss the need for a public–private partnership that has made terrorism coverage widely available and affordable, given most insurers’ refusal to provide terrorism coverage following 9/11, which left American corporations largely uncovered and the government de facto liable should relief have to be provided after an attack. We then briefly outline the current risk-sharing structure under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) and characterize expected losses from three types of terrorist attack scenarios—one conventional (10-ton truck bomb) and two nonconventional (sarin contamination and nuclear explosion)—in downtown Chicago, Illinois; Houston, Texas; Los Angeles, California; and New York City, New York, using modeling capability of the modeling firm Risk Management Solutions (RMS). We quantify the loss distribution across stakeholders under different scenarios, loss levels, and locations of the attack. Combining
market data on insurers operating in these four states provided from the rating agency A.M. Best, we then determine loss sharing under the 2015 TRIA legislation.

Making Terrorism Insurance Available and Affordable via a Public–Private Partnership

Two factors play a role in insurers’ behavior with respect to pricing and coverage decisions about terrorism risk and other low-probability high-consequence events: the impact of large losses and the ability to characterize the likelihood of an event occurring in the future. Until insurers have experienced significant losses from a particular extreme event, they are likely to treat the probability of such an event as below their threshold level of concern.

In the case of terrorism, notwithstanding the WTC bombing of 1993, the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, and other costly attacks outside of the United States (e.g., the 1993 and 1996 bombings in the financial district of London, UK), the likelihood of large claims payments from terrorist attacks in the United States was still deemed by insurers to be quite small because prior to 9/11, the insurance industry had never suffered catastrophic terrorism losses. In fact, actuaries and underwriters did not price the risk associated with terrorism nor did they exclude this coverage from their standard commercial policies (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2004).

But following their $32.5 billion loss from the 9/11 terrorist attacks, many global reinsurers refused to continue to provide insurers with protection against severe losses from another attack (Cummins and Lewis, 2003). These insurers concluded that they could not offer terrorism insurance because the uncertainties surrounding the likelihood and consequences of another large-scale terrorist attack were viewed as so significant that they considered the risk to be uninsurable by the private sector alone.

Since terrorists are likely to design their strategy as a function of their resources and knowledge of the vulnerability of the entity they want to attack, the nature of the risk is continuously evolving. Moreover, the nature of terrorist organizations, their modus operandi, and possible targets change over time. For instance, Al Qaeda is today a very different organization than it was in 2001, and yet very different from ISIS. The dynamic uncertainty associated with the ever-changing nature of terrorism makes the likelihood of future terrorist events extremely difficult to estimate in a given year, the typical length of a commercial insurance contract (Michel-Kerjan, 2003, 2014).

Such uncertainty creates difficulties in pricing coverage. Empirical evidence shows that insurers will set premiums higher for events with ambiguous probabilities and uncertain losses than for well-specified risks—if they agree to insure at all. Underwriters of primary insurance companies and reinsurance firms were surveyed about the prices they would charge to insure a factory against property damage from a severe earthquake when probabilities and losses were well specified, and when the probabilities and losses were ambiguous. The premiums the insurers charged for the ambiguous case were 1.43–1.77 times higher than if priced a precise risk (Kunreuther et al., 1993).

A recent Web-based experiment provided actuaries and underwriters in insurance companies in the United States with scenarios in which they seek advice and request probability forecasts from different groups of experts and then must determine what price to charge for coverage for flood damage and wind damage from hurricanes. The average premiums that insurers
The few insurers who continued to provide terrorism coverage right after 9/11 charged extremely high premiums to protect themselves against a serious loss. For example, prior to 9/11, Chicago’s O’Hare Airport had $750 million of terrorism insurance coverage at an annual premium of $125,000. After the terrorist attacks, insurers offered the airport only $150 million of coverage at an annual premium of $6.9 million. This new premium, if actuarially fair, implies the annual likelihood of a terrorist attack on O’Hare Airport to be approximately 1 in 22 ($6.9 million/$150 million), an extremely high probability. The airport was forced to purchase this policy since it could not operate without coverage (in nominal 2002 prices) (Jaffee and Russell, 2003).

The lack of availability of affordable terrorism insurance was problematic since many businesses are required to have this coverage as a condition for a mortgage and it must be included in workers’ compensation (WC) insurance in most states. Businesses operating in the United States found it increasingly difficult to purchase commercial property insurance that included the risk of terrorism. As a result, real estate and commercial ventures were stalled because of an inability to obtain the requisite insurance coverage. After another large attack, only a small portion of the total losses would have been paid by insurers and their reinsurers. In this scenario, the government will likely be called upon to rescue unprotected firms, meaning the large majority of it will be paid by all of us as taxpayers.

LOSS-SHARING DESIGN UNDER TRIA
The Passage of the TRIA

These concerns led Congress to pass and the president to sign the TRIA at the end of 2002. TRIA is a public–private partnership by which the U.S. government provides a financial backstop to help the private insurance market provide financial protection against terrorism risk. TRIA established a risk-sharing mechanism between the insurance industry, the federal government, and all commercial policyholders in the United States for covering insured losses to enterprises from future terrorist attacks (U.S. Congress, 2002). In return for federal protection against large losses and to ensure that terrorism coverage was available to commercial firms, TRIA requires all U.S. primary insurance companies to offer coverage against terrorism risk on the same terms and conditions as other perils provided by their commercial insurance policies. Insurers are not restricted regarding the price of this coverage and firms are not required to purchase it unless mandated by state law, which is normally the case for WC insurance.

The Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act (P.L. 109–144) was passed in 2005 and modified in 2007 through the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act (P.L. 110–160). Congress failed to renew the program in December 2014 so it expired until it was modified and extended in January 2015 until December 31, 2020. Each of the renewals of TRIA increased the portion of the risk assumed by the insurance industry

would charge was approximately 30 percent higher for coverage against either of these risks if the probability of damage was ambiguous rather than well specified and if the experts were conflicted over their estimates. The data reveal that they would likely charge more in the case of conflict ambiguity (i.e., experts disagree on point estimates) than imprecise ambiguity (i.e., experts agree on a range of probability, recognizing that they cannot estimate the probability of the event precisely).
so that it now will bear the entire insured loss from attacks when total damage does not exceed $60 billion, as we show in the next section.

Current Risk Sharing Design

Under TRIA’s 2015 renewed design,² events certified as terrorism by the federal government and resulting in over a certain trigger in insured losses in TRIA-eligible lines of business ($100 million in 2015, which is gradually increased up to $200 million over time) would be shared as follows:

Commercial policyholders would be responsible for paying any losses within their standard insurance policy deductibles under TRIA; if these firms had declined to purchase terrorism coverage for property and business losses they will be fully responsible for their losses from an attack. Commercial insurance companies would then provide coverage for all losses in excess of these TRIA deductibles, provided that total insurance industry losses did not exceed $100 billion (often referred to as the TRIA “program cap”).

Insurers are responsible for covering losses up to a TRIA deductible \(D^*\) set equal to 20 percent of that company’s prior year’s direct earned premium (DEP) for the lines covered under the program, after which the federal government would then reinsure the commercial insurer’s terrorism losses. \(D^*\) has increased from significantly over time: from 1 percent in 2002, 7 percent in 2002 and 2003, 10 percent in 2004, 15 percent in 2005, 17.5 percent in 2006, to 20 percent since 2007 and remained at that level for the 2015 renewal of TRIA. For large insurers, this TRIA deductible can be significant. Losses in excess of each insurer deductible would be shared between the insurance company and the federal government; federal share of compensation was set at 85 percent of insured losses that exceed insurer deductibles until January 1, 2016. Then the federal share is decreased by 1 percentage point per calendar year until it reaches 80 percent (Figure 1 shows the 80–20 loss sharing).

Should total insurance industry losses exceed $100 billion, primary insurers are responsible for reimbursing policyholders only for their proportionate share of losses up to $100 billion and Congress shall determine the procedure and source of any payments for the uninsured losses.

Figure 1 depicts the public–private loss sharing for a representative insurer covering terrorism for its commercial policyholders (either through WC or property insurance) under the current TRIA arrangement when total insured losses are less than $100 billion. If a terrorism loss incurred by an insurance company \((i)\) is less than its TRIA deductible amount \((D_i)\), as determined as a percentage of its prior-year DEP in TRIA-eligible lines, the insurer does not receive any reimbursement from the federal government. This situation is illustrated by an insured loss of \(L_1\) where the insurer’s payment is represented by the oblique lines on the left side of Figure 1.

When the insured loss from a certified terrorist attack is above the insurer’s deductible, as depicted by \(L_2\) in Figure 1, the insurer pays the entire claim and the federal government reimburses the insurer for 83 percent in 2017, 82 percent in 2018, 81 percent in 2019, and

² The text of the legislation is available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-114hr26enr/pdf/BILLS-114hr26enr.pdf.
Loss Sharing Under TRIA Between an Insurer and the Federal Government

Note: The loss sharing between the federal government and an insurer was 85–15 percent in 2015, then 84–16 percent in 2016, 83–17 percent in 2017, 82–18 percent in 2018, 81–19 percent in 2019, and 80–20 percent of the losses above deductible starting on January 1, 2020.

80 percent of the losses above its deductible starting on January 1, 2020. We consider the 80 percent loss sharing in Figure 1 as an illustrative example. The horizontal lines on the right side of the figure represent the federal payment. \( D_i \) plays an important role in determining loss sharing between insurers and the federal government and can amount to very large sums for many insurers. Should a terrorist attack occur this year, insurers will be responsible for losses equal to 20 percent of their DEP from last year.

The federal government recoups its payments between the total insurers’ outlays and a mandatory recoupment amount that will by levying surcharges on all commercially insured policyholders (at a 140 percent rate). Should uncompensated insurer outlays across the insurance industry exceed the mandatory recoupment amount, the U.S. Treasury has the option to collect some or all federal payments over time through a discretionary recoupment mechanism; see Figure 2).³

³ This mandatory recoupment increases by $2 billion a year starting in 2016 from the 2015 level of $27.5 billion so it eventually becomes $37.5 billion. We assume $37.5 billion as the mandatory recoupment in our analysis. For terrorist acts occurring before 2018, all mandatory recoupment premiums must be collected by September 30, 2019. For attacks in 2018, 35 percent of amount is to be collected by September 30, 2019, and the rest by September 30, 2024. For acts on or after January 1, 2019, all of the mandatory recoupment premiums would be collected by September 30, 2024. For simplicity we assume no discount rate in our calculation.
If the entire insurance industry suffers terrorism losses on their U.S. portfolio that requires the government to cover a portion of their claims, then these outlays shall be fully or partially recouped ex post, as described above. Insurers levy this surcharge against all commercial property and casualty policyholders, whether or not they had purchased terrorism insurance, and transfer the collected funds to the Treasury.

Figure 2 depicts the repayment schedule between all the insurers whose policyholders suffer an insured terrorist attack (the area depicted by oblique lines), all commercial policyholders (solid area), and the taxpayers (area depicted by horizontal lines) after the federal government has reimbursed all insurers for their share of their claims payments above their individual TRIA deductible level. In the example considered here, since the total insured loss L for the entire insurance industry is greater than the industry retention (set at $27.5 billion in 2015, and increased by $2 billion a year until it reaches $37.5 billion) but total losses retained by insurers within their deductibles and coinsurance requirements are below the market aggregate retention of $37.5 billion (assuming as

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4 The insurance marketplace aggregate retention amount was established at the lesser of $27.5 billion, increasing annually by $2 billion until it equals $37.5 billion, and the aggregate amount of insured losses for the calendar year for all insurers. In the calendar year following the calendar year in which the marketplace retention amount equals $37.5 billion, and beginning in calendar year 2020 it is revised to be the lesser of the annual average of the sum of insurer deductibles for all insurers participating in the Program for the prior 3 calendar years as such sum is determined by the Secretary of the Treasury by regulation.
an example this is the threshold the year the attack occurs), a portion of the federal outlays are subject to the mandatory recoupment. Should the federal government elect to exercise its authority to levy a discretionary recoupment surcharge against commercial policyholders to fund federal outlays not covered by the mandatory recoupment mechanism, there would be a 1-for-1 reallocation of loss from taxpayers to commercial policyholders. For our analysis, we do not allocate losses to the discretionary recoupment mechanism as it reflects one of many alternatives by which the federal government could fund uncompensated federal outlays.

**Market Penetration and Terrorism Insurance Cost**

**Market Penetration**

TRIA’s most important success, in the absence of large-scale terrorist attacks on U.S. soil since 9/11, was to significantly reduce and stabilize the price of terrorism insurance compared to premiums charged between 9/11 and the enactment of this legislation. Surveys undertaken on a regular basis since the inception of TRIA by Marsh and Aon, the two largest insurance brokers operating in the United States, provide a good representation of the market for medium and large accounts.

Figure 3 depicts the evolution of average TRIA-coverage penetration among 1,500–1,600 clients of Marsh over time (across industries, geographies, and firm’s size). The market penetration for these larger firms has remained somewhat stable at around 60 percent during the past 10 years.

**Figure 3**

TRIA Coverage Over the Period 2003–2015

Sources: Authors with data from Marsh.
The remaining 40 percent should not necessarily been interpreted as totally uninsured as firms can purchase stand-alone terrorism insurance coverage for all their U.S. and foreign operations that is not dependent on TRIA. Firms can also be self-insured through the use of dedicated captives and/or structured debt (e.g., warrants, convertible and forgivable debt) and contingent capital (i.e., financing that is contingent on the occurrence of specified events). Moreover, a number of smaller companies may be insured without utilizing these larger insurance brokers.

Take-Up Rates Across Geographies and Industry Sectors

A higher percentage of companies in the Northeast (72 percent) purchased property terrorism insurance in 2015 than in any other region, likely attributable to the concentration of large metropolitan areas, including Washington, DC, and New York—the perception that major cities may be at a higher risk of a terrorist attack, population density, and that the region was the site of the 2001 terrorist attacks. The Midwest and South had the lowest take-up rates in 2015, at 57 and 54 percent, according to Marsh data.\(^5\)

Terrorism insurance purchasing varies significantly by industry sector, too. According to Marsh, media companies purchased property terrorism insurance at a high rate (79 percent), followed by education (75 percent), hospitality and gaming (74 percent), health-care organizations (73 percent), financial institutions (71 percent), and real estate (71 percent). The three industry sectors with the lowest take-up rates were manufacturing (49 percent), chemicals (45 percent), and energy and mining (33 percent).\(^6\) Differences seem to be large in part due to some industries having exposure concentrations in central business districts and major metropolitan areas that are likely perceived as being at higher risk for terrorism (Marsh, 2016).

Until very recently, these were the best longitudinal market data available. There have been calls for a national data collection on the U.S. terrorism insurance market by the federal government given that the terrorism insurance gap is an issue of importance for markets and national security (Michel-Kerjan, 2013). When TRIA was renewed in 2015, Congress requested the U.S. Treasury to collaborate with the insurance industry so more granular data could be collected. In a report released in June 2016,\(^7\) the U.S. Treasury estimates that based on the data provided by insurers that volunteer to release their information, terrorism risk insurance penetration is around 80 percent across the

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\(^5\) Geography is defined as the location of the headquarters of the firm. This is of course only a proxy since those firms have operations in many places around the country.

\(^6\) The take-up rate has remained relatively stable in industry sectors where the take-up rate is high. For instance, it was 82 percent in 2010 in media, and already above 70 percent in education, health care, financials, and real estate. But the take-up rate has somewhat declined in industry sectors where it is the lowest. For instance, it was 51 percent in energy and mining in 2010, versus 33 percent in 2015.

\(^7\) The report is based on voluntary reporting by insurers for the first year (2005). Fifty-two insurer groups provided some or all of the requested information; they represent about $85 billion in TRIP-eligible line DEP, or about 41 percent of the 2015 total DEP for terrorism risk insurance program’s eligible lines. This group of insurers includes 11 of the 25 largest insurance groups (by total premiums in TRIP-eligible lines), and approximately 25 percent of insurers whose size would require submission of complete data in future years under Treasury’s proposed rules released on April 1, 2016.
country (based on the number of policies issued). Such a metric is useful for measuring the number of firms that are insured but it might also be biased or even skewed by less costly risks with lower total insured values (TIVs). Take-up rates measured by premiums or TIVs may more closely estimate the amount of insured business activity. Based on the data collected by the U.S. Treasury, the 2015 market penetration rate is estimated to be lower, at about 70 percent when such alternative metrics are used (U.S. Treasury, 2016). This means that on average firms purchase a lower quantity of coverage for terrorism risk than they do for other lines, even though this difference is not very large.

This confirms an earlier study of the U.S. terrorism insurance market for large firms. Michel-Kerjan et al. (2015) compared the degree of coverage for terrorism insurance and property insurance, defined as the ratio of the limit on the terrorism (property) insurance policy the firm purchased (i.e., the maximum terrorism (property) claim payment it can receive from its insurers minus the deductible) to TIV. They find the mean degree of coverage against terrorism risks to be is 48 percent, and the mean degree of coverage for property to be about 55 percent.

Cost of Terrorism Risk Insurance

The passage of TRIA quickly stabilized the market at a much lower cost to insured firms. By 2005, the median national cost for larger firms, all industries and geographies combined, was $42 per million dollars of TIV. Overall, the cost of TRIA terrorism insurance has continued to decrease in the years that followed.\(^8\)

Pricing depends on the perceived likelihood of an attack market conditions and on the quantity of insurance purchased compared to the TIV of a firm. Using data from Marsh, Tables 1 and 2 provide a more granular analysis to summarize the median cost of TRIA terrorism insurance by total insured value (TIV) (Table 1) and also as a percentage of what a firm pays for its property coverage (Table 2). This generally is in keeping with overall insurance pricing patterns: larger companies typically purchase more insurance, which leads to lower average rates per dollar of coverage compared to rates for smaller companies.

In its 2013 Terrorism Risk Insurance Report, Marsh noted:

> Although this suggests that the cost of terrorism coverage generally remained the same in the various size classes, individual businesses may have experienced significant swings based on their property insurance program’s performance. For example, organizations with significant catastrophe (CAT) losses may have faced large increases in their overall property insurance program, but little change in their terrorism insurance pricing, resulting in a smaller percentage of their overall premium being attributed to terrorism coverage. Conversely, companies that had favorable loss histories in recent years may have experienced rate decreases in their overall programs

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\(^8\) International comparisons are also helpful, even though they should be taken with caution since programs and type of coverage differ from one country to another. Recent results are somewhat puzzling, though. For instance, Michel-Kerjan and Pedell (2006) analyze terrorism insurance costs of 2,600 large companies in the United States and Germany that decided to purchase that coverage in 2006, and conclude that terrorism insurance prices (defined as premiums over quantity of insurance purchased) in Germany were then on average 2 to 4 times \textit{higher} than in the United States.
Is Terrorism Insurance Affordable?

Another criterion to evaluate a national disaster risk financing program is whether it is affordable. The market data lead us to conclude that indeed terrorism insurance quickly became affordable under the TRIA public–private partnership: paying a relatively small extra premium for being insured against a federally declared terrorist attacks on U.S. soil was attractive to many firms, which translated into a relatively high market penetration. Moreover, the demand for this coverage is not only strong, as the data we just discussed about market penetration indicate, it is also fairly price inelastic. A recent study shows that terrorism insurance price elasticity is in the 0.1–0.2 range: a 10 percent increase in premiums will only decrease demand by 1 or 2 percent. As an element of comparison, the same study shows that a 10 percent increase in commercial property insurance will lead to a reduction of demand which is twice this size (Michel-Kerjan et al., 2015). Comparing commercial demand for property and terrorism insurance, our findings suggest that both are rather price inelastic but that corporate demand for terrorism insurance is significantly more price inelastic than demand for property insurance.\(^9\)

It is also worth mentioning that a number of insurers actually include terrorism insurance in their coverage at no cost. The aforementioned U.S. Treasury report states that

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\(^9\) Depending on the estimation technique used for the analysis, the price elasticity for property coverage ranges from \(-0.43\) to \(-0.82\), while for corporate demand for terrorism coverage it ranges from \(-0.31\) to \(-0.71\).
“approximately 23 percent of insurers” it collected data from “offered terrorism risk insurance at a disclosed $0 premium charge. An insurer might offer terrorism risk coverage for a disclosed $0 premium charge to ease administrative burdens or for other idiosyncratic reasons, and/or due to the lack of any cognizable terrorism risk presented in certain regions or under certain policies.”

An open question in analyzing the affordability of insurance under this TRIA program is how the market will react in the aftermath of another large attack triggering significant insured losses. Will capacity be significantly reduced and will prices go significantly higher than they currently are, and, if so, for how long? The answers to these questions depend on the nature of the attack, its size, and the market conditions when it occurs. For example, if there is excess capacity in the insurance market the premium increase may be relatively small; however, if the terrorist attack occurs after a series of costly natural disasters that have constrained capacity, premiums might be significantly higher.

If the next terrorist attack were to occur in the distant future, insurers would have continued to collect premiums and may be in a position to cover the losses without a significant impact on their capacity. In its analysis, building on data collected by A.M. Best, the Treasury Department estimates that insurers have collected about $27.3 billion in terrorism insurance premiums in the United States between 2003 and 2015 (corrected for inflation; 2016 prices).

A related question is whether commercial firms will start putting pressure on their insurers to reduce the cost of terrorism even further absence of any new attack in the coming years. Suppose 10 years from now that insurers in the United States have collected a total of $50 billion in premiums since the inception of the TRIA program without any substantial claims. Would some firms, or some policymakers, raise questions that premiums are too high compared to the risk? This is a well-known issue with low-probability, high-consequence events.

Another question is whether disaster insurance programs link insurance with risk reduction. The TRIA program does not provide incentives for reducing risk as the legislation focused on the risk-sharing arrangement between insurers and the federal government, not on the demand side of the market. Terrorism is also more challenging

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10 Data collected by the Treasury put the cost of terrorism insurance to about 2.6 percent of property premium for insurers that charge for that coverage. This percentage varies based on the TRIP-eligible lines of coverage, with the highest rates charged for excess WC insurance and aircraft insurance. Once policies are included for which insurers do not charge anything to cover terrorism for certain lines of business, this percentage is lower at about 2 percent (U.S. Treasury, 2016).

11 In its 2016 Report on the Overall Effectiveness of the Terrorism Risk Insurance, the U.S. Treasury noted: This amount may be understated because it is based in part upon charges as reported to A.M. Best, which does not rate every participating insurer, and presumably not every insurer completed the supplemental rating questionnaire in, given that A.M. Best has evaluated the vast majority of insurers that write TRIP-eligible insurance lines, the A.M. Best data likely provide a reasonable estimate of terrorism risk premium that was charged and collected from 2004 through 2013. When adjusted for the missing years, the figure is premised upon the best information available (U.S. Treasury, 2016).
than natural disaster risks in determining how firms can reduce their exposure to a large terrorist attack aside from increasing security and screening in its buildings. With respect to flood risk, for instance, one can institute land-use regulations, well-enforced building codes, and provide economic incentives for property owners to invest in loss reduction measures such as elevating the structure building or wet or dry flood proofing and for communities to building levees or dams. The other challenge with terrorism is that it is a dynamic threat: a terrorist organization can react to certain security measures in place at one facility by changing its mode of attack or attack in areas where security is lower (Michel-Kerjan, 2003).

**Determining Terrorism Risk Costs: Methodology and Application to the Four Largest American Cities**

Insurers are concerned about their exposure to terrorism losses given the deductible and coinsurance arrangement under TRIA that determines the cost-sharing arrangement with the federal government. For this reason and given the difficulty in estimating the likelihood of a terrorist attack, insurers often utilize scenarios to determine their maximum exposure in relation to their assets for a range of terrorist actions by location and mode of attack. Allocation of risk between policyholders, insurers, and taxpayers under TRIA requires a detailed analysis of the impact of specific scenarios. To undertake this microanalysis, we accessed market data from A.M. Best on 764 insurers doing business in the four states that we analyze here.

**Methodology**

We adopt the following methodology for allocating losses from a specific scenario. First, we specify the nature of the terrorist attack and determine potential economic losses (including business interruption and WC) by simulating the attack in the downtown of our four focus cities using modeling capability from the modeling firm RMS. We then determine the proportion of losses assumed by each of the affected parties. While insurance companies use many different scenarios across multiple locations, we selected three possible attack scenarios to conduct our analysis (RMS, 2013; Kunreuther et al., 2014).

**Scenario A: 10-Ton (20,000-Pound) Truck Bomb Attack.** In the 10-ton bomb scenario, a bomb made from conventional explosives is delivered by a truck or other vehicle and detonated as close to the target as possible. Ammonium Nitrate Fuel-Oil (ANFO) is the assumed explosive material, as this is a common commercial explosive. The raw materials for constructing this bomb are more readily available than other explosive materials, although access has been increasingly difficult since 9/11. Other high-explosive materials could be substituted with the same result, assuming equivalent yields. The pressure wave produced by the bomb around the detonation point is sufficient to cause structural and architectural damage as well as injuries and fatalities.

This scenario assumes the 10-ton bomb is detonated at street level in front of the target structure, close enough for the maximum blast pressure generated by the explosion to

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12 This section is based on Kunreuther et al. (2014).
be exerted on the building structure. Blast effects of an explosion are in the form of a shock wave composed of a high-pressure shock front, which expands outward from the center of the detonation, with the pressure intensity decaying with distance and as a function of time. The magnitude and distribution of the shock wave pressures are a function of the following elements: explosive properties, location of the explosive relative to the structure, and amplification of the pressure by its interaction with the ground and immediate surrounding buildings. Architectural damage is dominated by shattering glass in windows, and the resulting glass projectiles are the source of most injuries. Large pressure waves can also cause serious injuries, primarily to the ears and lungs.

Given its size, ambition, and complexity, few historical precedents exist for a terrorist bomb of this size. In June 1996, Hezbollah attacked Khobar Towers, a U.S. military accommodation complex in Dharan, Saudi Arabia with a bomb estimated to be of comparable magnitude to 10 tons. This is the largest terrorist vehicle bomb that has ever been detonated. The force of the explosion was so great it heavily damaged or destroyed six high-rise apartment buildings and shattered windows in virtually every other structure in the compound, leaving a crater in the ground 85 feet wide and 35 feet deep. The blast was felt 20 miles away in Bahrain.

Overall, we find that a 10-ton truck bomb attack would cost $26.6 billion in Los Angeles, $28.3 billion in Houston, $32.1 billion in New York City, and $36.6 billion in Chicago. The analysis reveals that property loss and business interruption range from $19 billion in Houston to $26.4 billion in Chicago. Workers’ compensation (WC) losses range from $6.7 billion in Los Angeles to $12.7 billion in New York City (the difference due primarily to different worker density in these cities).

Scenario B: 1-Ton Sarin Chemical Agent Release Attack. Sarin is the agent chosen for modeling a chemical attack based on technical and logistical requirements and terrorist interests. Like all nerve agents, sarin works by interfering with the mechanisms through which one’s nerves communicate with one’s bodily organs. Sarin is a liquid at ambient temperature. In vapor form, sarin is heavier than air and as a result will cling to floors, sink into basements, and gravitate toward low terrain. Sarin is also absorbed by the skin very rapidly.

The impact of such a chemical attack is affected by the time of occurrence, emergency response, and weather conditions, including wind speed and wind direction, and the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning filtration systems in operation at affected locations. Victims who inhale large amounts soon lose consciousness, go into convulsions, and stop breathing. Inhalation of even low concentrations of the gas can be fatal (100 mg per cubic meter per minute will kill 50 percent of those exposed). If mass casualties occurred from a sarin gas attack, civil authority exclusion areas would be applied around the affected area and it would take time to clean up, investigate the scene of the crime, and reestablish public confidence to return to the location. For this attack mode, it is also assumed that there will be an “area of exclusion” for which there will be no physical damage, but there will be losses due to contingent business interruption and business interruption losses associated with civil authority coverage provided in the underlying property policies. It could take several months for the full clean-up to be completed and the area reopened.
We determine the average property losses, WC losses, and total losses dollar figures in the central business districts of Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, and New York for a representative 1-ton sarin attack as follows. Total losses in Chicago: $17.1 billion ($9.8 billion for property losses and $7.3 billion for WC); total losses in Houston: $9.2 billion ($4.9 billion for property and $7.3 billion for WC); total losses for Los Angeles: $11.8 billion ($6.2 billion for property and $5.6 billion for WC); and total losses for New York City: $25 billion ($15.6 billion for property and $9.4 billion for WC). The different building and worker density in New York and Chicago, versus Houston and Los Angeles, is the main driver of the difference in loss levels.

*Scenario C: 1-Kiloton Nuclear Weapon Attack.* Detonation of a 1-kiloton nuclear weapon would have devastating consequences in an urban area. There are no known cases of a terrorist group getting close to obtaining, let alone using, a nuclear device. However, in 1998, an unsuccessful attempt by Al Qaeda to purchase uranium from black-market sources suggested an interest in the development of nuclear and radiological weapons. The nuclear bomb attack scenario considered here is a “suitcase bomb”-style nuclear device of 1-kiloton yield detonated in a city center. Although rarer than larger yield nuclear bombs, this size represents one that may be less difficult for terrorists to obtain or develop.\(^{13}\)

Losses that result from any nuclear detonation are so severe that a low-end range of yield was selected as a representative attack. Damage agents include blast wave and intense heat, fires around the perimeter of the destroyed zone, radiation, and radioactive fallout that causes casualties and requires decontamination for many miles. Long-term health effects of radioactive fallout are not included in modeling WC losses.

The impact of an attack is affected by the time of its occurrence, emergency response measures—especially urban fire suppression and medical treatment capability for very large numbers of injured—and weather conditions. Within the explosion impact region, the effects of radiation are not very significant because the bomb destroys much of the property that might be contaminated. Outside of the area affected by the explosion, there are radiation impacts due to fallout. Destruction from a nuclear device would come from several sources. The bomb will produce a pressure wave similar to that of a conventional bomb, although much larger in magnitude. A large amount of heat will also be generated, causing burns and fires. Finally, a plume of radioactive material will be generated, and dispersed by the wind.

The loss model uses different vulnerability functions based on construction class and building height. Business interruption losses are anticipated to be significant given the time needed to repair extensive physical damage, extra expense required for re-location, and reticence of employees to return to work. The loss estimates developed were validated against Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bomb casualty studies, as well as benchmarked against published scenario studies by government agencies. We

\(^{13}\) Though referred to as a “suitcase bomb,” in reality it weighs hundreds of pounds and requires several people just to lift. Logistically, a nuclear attack of this type is extremely difficult to execute, requiring highly specialized technical skills, many operatives, years of planning, and significant financial resources.
determine the average property losses, WC losses, and total losses dollar figures in the central business districts of Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, and New York for a representative 1-kiloton nuclear attack as follows. Total losses in Houston: $174.9 billion ($99.7 billion for property and business interruption and $74.2 billion for WC); total losses in Los Angeles: $233.2 billion ($163.3 billion for property and $69.9 billion for WC); total losses in Chicago: $342.3 billion ($241.4 billion for property and $100.9 billion for WC); and the total losses in New York are the highest again, with a staggering $552.3 billion ($392.7 billion for property and $159.6 billion for WC).

Public–Private Loss Sharing Under the New TRIA Legislation

How would losses from such terrorist attacks be distributed across insurers, commercial policyholders, and the federal government? This section examines this question under the three different terrorist attack scenarios described above with respect to location and magnitude of damage.

Data and Methodology. We utilized data on 764 insurers operating in at least one of the states in which the four cities are located to allocate losses from a terrorist attack among the insurance companies operating in each state today. Rating agency A.M. Best provided us with information on each insurer’s DEP for all TRIA lines, and also with their market share in the four states. These firms comprised virtually 100 percent of the terrorism insurance market placed with U.S. licensed primary insurance carriers with respect to TRIA-line DEP at the end of 2012. Property insurance lines have been separated from WC lines. Actual losses from a terrorist attack are unlikely to be distributed among insurance companies exactly according to their market share in the affected state but this is an assumption we have to make for simplicity.

We assume a 50 percent take-up rate for terrorism insurance for the property lines, recognizing that the actual percentage may vary from one city to another as well as by the type of firm. Since terrorism cannot be excluded from WC insurance and must be purchased by commercial enterprises, we assume a 100 percent take-up rate for terrorism-related WC losses. These assumptions apply to all the analyses undertaken below.

Analysis of Loss Distribution Across Key Stakeholders Varying the Location of the Attack and Size of the Loss. We utilize projected damage to each of the four cities from a 10-ton truck bomb based on data discussed above to determine the distribution of losses among the noninsured, insured, all policyholders, and the federal government. One could also undertake similar analyses using the other scenarios discussed in the previous section.

Table 3 examines how the losses associated with the 10-ton truck bomb would be shared among insurers, commercial policyholders, and the federal government in these four cities. For each city, we determined the market share of the 764 insurers from data

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14 We assume that the federal government collects only the mandatory recoupment portion of the insured losses it pays up-front, and not the discretionary amount. This assumption is similar to the one made by the Congressional Budget Office (2014) in its estimate of the impacts on different stakeholders in its analysis for the renewal of TRIA in 2007.
Table 3
Losses Due to a 10-Ton Truck Bomb

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Loss</th>
<th>Property</th>
<th>WC</th>
<th>Noninsured</th>
<th>Total Insured</th>
<th>Insurers</th>
<th>Commercial Policyholders</th>
<th>Federal Taxpayers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>$36.59</td>
<td>$26.39</td>
<td>$10.21</td>
<td>$13.19</td>
<td>$23.40</td>
<td>$21.25</td>
<td>$3.01</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>$28.29</td>
<td>$19.02</td>
<td>$9.27</td>
<td>$9.51</td>
<td>$18.78</td>
<td>$15.22</td>
<td>$4.98</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>$26.51</td>
<td>$19.86</td>
<td>$6.65</td>
<td>$9.93</td>
<td>$16.58</td>
<td>$14.77</td>
<td>$2.53</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>$32.07</td>
<td>$19.38</td>
<td>$12.69</td>
<td>$9.69</td>
<td>$22.38</td>
<td>$16.74</td>
<td>$7.90</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All numbers in $ billion; we assume a 50 percent take-up rate on property lines, 100 percent on workers’ compensation lines (WC), and a federal recoupment that applies only to the mandatory recoupment portion, not the discretionary portion for reasons explained above in the text. 80–20 percent co-share, 20 percent deductible, $37.5 billion retention; 140 percent recoupment rate against commercial policyholders.

Table 4
Impact of $25 Billion Loss Scenario in Different Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Loss</th>
<th>Property</th>
<th>WC</th>
<th>Noninsured</th>
<th>Total Insured</th>
<th>Insurers</th>
<th>Commercial Policyholders</th>
<th>Federal Taxpayers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>$25.00</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
<td>$10.00</td>
<td>$7.50</td>
<td>$17.50</td>
<td>$16.28</td>
<td>$1.71</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>$25.00</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
<td>$10.00</td>
<td>$7.50</td>
<td>$17.50</td>
<td>$13.92</td>
<td>$5.01</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>$25.00</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
<td>$10.00</td>
<td>$7.50</td>
<td>$17.50</td>
<td>$14.85</td>
<td>$3.71</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>$25.00</td>
<td>$15.00</td>
<td>$10.00</td>
<td>$7.50</td>
<td>$17.50</td>
<td>$13.60</td>
<td>$5.46</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All numbers in $ billion; we assume a 50 percent take-up rate on property lines, 100 percent on workers’ compensation lines (WC), and a federal recoupment that applies only to the mandatory recoupment portion, not the discretionary portion for reasons explained above in the text. 80–20 percent co-share, 20 percent deductible, $37.5 billion retention; 140 percent recoupment rate against commercial policyholders.

provided by A.M. Best, their individual deductible under TRIA (based on 2012 TRIA-line premiums collected), and the proportion of their insured losses covered by the federal government based on the loss-sharing formula in TRIA 2015. We see that the insured losses from a 10-ton truck bomb in any of the four cities will be covered entirely by the insurers or their commercial policyholders with the federal government not responsible for any of the losses. (The federal government recoups the entire amount of its payments since the total insured loss is below the $37.5 billion mandatory recoupment we use here for the analysis; as indicated earlier in the article, this industry retention depends on the year the attack would occur and market conditions.)

Table 4 then provides the results of the analysis now assuming that the total loss was fixed at $25 billion, with $15 billion in property damage and $10 billion in WC for each of the four cities where the 10-ton truck bomb attack occurred. Of the $25 billion total loss, $17.5 billion was insured. Insurers in New York tend to be larger than those in Chicago and as a result have a higher deductible under TRIA. Therefore, they will absorb a larger portion of the loss before assessing their commercial policyholders. For this $25 billion loss scenario, there are no costs to the federal government in each of the four cities since losses are below the $37.5 billion mandatory recoupment we assume here.
Using the examples of possible terrorist attack scenarios specified in the previous section, we can analyze the entire spectrum of possible losses from $0 to $100 billion using the same assumptions as above regarding terrorism insurance coverage with respect to property damage and WC losses. The amounts paid by the relevant stakeholders as a function of losses to New York City from terrorist attacks are depicted in Figure 4a.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{15} We focused our discussion here on New York City. Similar analyses were conducted for Chicago, Los Angeles and Houston; results appear in Figures 4b, 4c, and 4d.
The following key findings emerge from our analysis:

- Insurers will always pay more than any other stakeholder.
- The federal government will ultimately not be responsible for any payments under TRIA 2015 until the total insured and uninsured losses from a terrorist attack exceed $60 billion. At this level of loss, insurers would pay $25.5 billion and commercial policyholders $16.85 billion; the remaining $18 billion would be uninsured.
- When total insured and noninsured losses reach $100 billion, insurers will ultimately be responsible for approximately $33.15 billion in payments, taxpayers
almost $30.75 billion, the commercial policyholders over $6.1 billion (through mandatory recoupment at a 140 percent rate); the remaining $30 billion would be uninsured.

- Commercial policyholders would almost always pay some post disaster governmental recoupment in New York City. The maximum they would pay—$18.5 billion—is reached when losses are $55 billion.

**Conclusions**

Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, insurers were reluctant to provide terrorism coverage because of the uncertainties associated with the risk and the possibility of another attack leading to catastrophic losses. TRIA, a public–private partnership, was enacted to provide financial protection against future terrorist attacks in the United States.

Among all disaster insurance programs in which the government is involved, TRIA is unique. First, it focuses only on commercial lines, not on homeowners. Second, it mandates insurers to offer that coverage to all their clients. Third, TRIA is not involved in price setting or primary insurance (contrary to the NFIP or the crop insurance program, for instance). Fourth, it provides free up-front reinsurance to insurers, a somewhat unique position if one compares TRIA to other terrorism insurance or reinsurance programs established internationally (see OECD, 2010, 2014; Michel-Kerjan, 2013; Government Accountability Office, 2014).

Over time, the successive reforms of the terrorism risk insurance program have transferred more risk from the taxpayers to the private sector. While TRIA does not directly include private reinsurers in its design, reinsurers have played a more important role in recent years, covering a portion of the losses insurers ultimately must pay (i.e., their deductible under TRIA and their portion of the risk above it) should another attack occur. Of the 41 insurers that provided information to the U.S. Treasury concerning reinsurance purchases (constituting a combined Program deductible amount of $17.3 billion), 37 (or 90 percent) reported the purchase of a total of $21 billion in reinsurance coverage for a single loss resulting from terrorism (U.S. Treasury, 2016).

Fifteen years after 9/11, it is surprising that financial protection against terrorism risk, which is so vital to our economy, remains largely understudied, compared to, say, natural disasters. The new data collection launched between the U.S. Treasury and insurers is certainly an important step in that direction.

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16 The Price–Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act (commonly called the Price–Anderson Act) is probably most similar to TRIA, although different in nature and much narrower. Established in 1957 and since renewed several times until 2026, it governs liability-related issues for all nonmilitary nuclear facilities. The Act establishes a no-fault insurance-type system in which the first approximately $12.6 billion (as of 2011) is industry funded as described in the Act; claims above the $12.6 billion would be covered by a congressional mandate to retroactively increase nuclear utility liability (somewhat similar to the recoupment process under TRIA) or would be covered by the federal government.
Overall, TRIA has worked well. It has stabilized a very disrupted market in the aftermath of 2001, making terrorism insurance widely available and affordable. Take-up rates among enterprises small and large are rather high and premiums a few percentage points of what firms pay for their property insurance, even though cost and take-up rates vary widely by size, industry, geography, and line of business.

We provide a quantitative analysis of the terrorism loss sharing under the federal TRIA program renewed in 2015 for three attack scenarios in four major cities in the United States. Under the new provisions of TRIA, for total losses from a terrorist attack below $60 billion, if the federal government advances funds to insurers to assist them in paying claims, it will ultimately recoup this amount at a 140 percent rate against all commercial policyholders and thus will not have to incur any costs. In earlier versions of TRIA, the government had to bear a portion of the costs when the losses were $25 billion or greater (Wharton Risk Center, 2005) so this has been, over time, a significant shift of the risk to the private sector.

An important factor that led to the passage of TRIA is the cost of capital that the private sector would need to hold if it were responsible for paying all the insured losses from a terrorist attack. In particular, the prices charged must cover the costs of allocating risk capital to protect the insurer or reinsurer against claims payments (Doherty, 2000). Given the ambiguity associated with the terrorism risk, large amounts of risk capital are required to be held internally by the insurer or reinsurer. The resulting premium will thus be high relative to the best estimate of expected losses to maintain the insurer’s credit rating (A.M. Best, 2013). Future studies on the costs of capital and their impact on insurance and reinsurance premiums for extreme events where the risk is uncertain and fat-tailed, such as terrorism, can provide insights in situations where public–private partnerships such as TRIA may be needed to enable insurers to provide coverage so that financial protection is widely available and affordable.

With the government providing free up-front protection against the truly catastrophic portion of losses from future terrorist attacks and in a position to recoup part of these against all commercial firms in the United States (whether or not they are covered against terrorism), insurers have been able to reduce the amount of costly capital they need to hold. Evidence reveals that this strategy has worked. As a result, and without any new major terrorism insurance claims since 9/11, insurance is available at premiums that have led to significant demand for coverage (on average, at about 3 percent of the premium paid by firms for property insurance). Commercial take-up rates for terrorism insurance have more than doubled from 27 percent in 2003 to 60 percent in 2006, a level that has remained stable since (62 percent today) (Michel-Kerjan et al., 2015).

The present calculations of loss sharing under TRIA do not include possible post-disaster relief from the federal government to uninsured firms that suffer losses from a future attack. However, based on the experience of 9/11 as well as the lessons learned from large-scale natural disasters, it is likely that the federal government will provide considerable assistance to uninsured victims (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2011). As a reference point, post-disaster relief and special congressional appropriations represented 80 percent of the cost of Hurricane Sandy in 2012 (Michel-Kerjan, 2013). But
absent legislation on such an intervention, this aid will be ad hoc and hard to quantify ex ante (LaTourrette and Clancy, 2014).

Finally, what is insured or not under the current program is an important market and policy question. TRIA focuses on commercial insureds but does not cover residents, which raises the question of the indemnification of individual victims of a terrorist attack (i.e., beyond WC). That terrorism insurance is relatively affordable in the United States also owes to the fact that two critical sources of devastating loss are typically not covered by insurers, thus not covered under the program: CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) attacks and cyberattacks. CBRN is typically excluded from insurance policies in the United States (except for WC), thus from TRIA coverage. Cyberterrorism insurance is only starting to be sold; the coming years will tell whether insurers are comfortable insuring large-scale cyberattacks for this line of business, and at what price. These are not uninsurable since both are included in terrorism insurance programs in other OECD countries (GAREAT in France and Pool Re in the United Kingdom), resulting of course in higher premiums paid by insured firms in these countries.

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